Contextualizing Cleburne by Bornstein, Laura C.
Golden Gate University Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation







LAURA C. BORNSTEIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court decided City of Cle-
burne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,1 involving a zoning ordi-
nance that discriminated against the “mentally retarded”2 in the estab-
lishment of group homes.  Most legal experts criticized the opinion as 
aberrant and unsound.3  A majority of the Court, represented by Justice 
Byron White, held that mental retardation was not a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,4 a conclusion that 
seemed wrong to observers of the Court in light of the immutable nature 
of mental retardation, the history of invidious discrimination against 
mentally retarded persons, and the exclusion of the mentally retarded 
from the political process.5  Moreover, it was unnecessary for the Court 
 
*Policy Counsel/Women’s Law and Public Policy Fellow at the National Partnership for 
Women & Families, Washington, D.C., 2010-2011; Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 2010, 
cum laude; Rice University, B.A. 2006, summa cum laude.  I wish to thank Victoria Nourse, a pio-
neer of legal “contextualization,” for inspiring this Article and providing feedback on early drafts.  I 
am also grateful to Bailey Bifoss and the staff of Golden Gate University Law Review for their edit-
ing work. 
 1 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 2 Although “intellectual disability” is now the preferred term for mental retardation in the 
medical and advocacy communities, this Article will use the older nomenclature to maintain consis-
tency with the Cleburne opinion. 
 3 See infra Part II. 
 4 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. 
 5 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (listing the “tradi-
tional indicia of suspectness” in equal protection jurisprudence). 
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to settle on a standard of review, because it proceeded to strike down the 
application of the zoning ordinance under rational-basis review.6  The 
Court could simply have stated that the city’s action failed even the low-
est level of scrutiny, thus leaving for another case the question of 
whether a higher level of scrutiny might be warranted for classifications 
based on mental retardation.  Finally, the Court’s decision to invalidate 
the ordinance as applied was unusual for two reasons: first, because the 
rational-relationship test is “typically so deferential as to amount to a vir-
tual rubber stamp”7 on legislation, and second, because the Court had 
never before employed the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate only a 
particular application of a statute.8 
The Court’s contortions in Cleburne were peculiar but not inexpli-
cable.  Precisely because the decision cannot be explained by reference 
to established modes of equal protection analysis, one can assume that 
the Justices of the majority were influenced by social and political fac-
tors.  After summarizing the facts and opinions in the case and examin-
ing Cleburne’s reception in the legal world (in Parts I and II, respec-
tively), Part III of this Article attempts to identify these external 
variables.  The mid-1980s were a high point of neighborhood hostility to 
group homes for persons with mental retardation, and a low point of fed-
eral spending and enforcement efforts on behalf of the mentally retarded.  
This social and political milieu, when met with Justice White’s unique 
brand of judicial restraint, produced a decision that, while resolving the 
immediate issue in favor of the group home residents, set a precedent 
that reinforced the second-class status of persons with mental disabilities.  
In conclusion, this Article assesses the long-term impact of the decision 
and argues that the need to overturn Cleburne is still strong. 
I.  THE CLEBURNE CASE 
In 1980, Jan Hannah, the vice president and part owner of Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc. (“CLC”), purchased a house in the city of Cleburne, 
Texas.9  She intended to lease the house to CLC for use as a group home 
for thirteen individuals with mild to moderate mental retardation.10  The 
 
 6 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.  Contra Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1982) (“[I]f the 
statutory scheme cannot pass even the [minimum rationality] test . . . we need not decide whether 
any enhanced scrutiny is called for.”). 
 7 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 
79 (1997). 
 8 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 9 Id. at 435 (majority opinion). 
 10 Id. 
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zoning regulations applicable to the site allowed apartment buildings, 
fraternity and sorority houses, and nursing homes.11  However, special 
use permits, valid for one year at a time, were needed for the operation of 
“[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, 
or penal or correctional institutions.”12  The city of Cleburne determined 
that the proposed group home should be classified as a “hospital for the 
feeble-minded,” thus requiring CLC to apply for a special use permit.13  
After holding a public hearing on CLC’s application, the city council 
voted to deny a special use permit.14 
CLC sued the city in federal district court, alleging that the zoning 
ordinance was invalid both on its face and as applied because it discrimi-
nated against mentally retarded persons in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.15  The district court applied the minimum level of judicial 
scrutiny available to equal protection claims and ruled that the ordinance 
was rationally related to the city’s legitimate interests in “‘the safety and 
fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood,’ and the number of 
people to be housed in the home.”16  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed.17  After considering the history of “unfair and often gro-
tesque mistreatment” of mentally retarded persons, their lack of political 
power, and the unalterable nature of mental retardation, the court deter-
mined that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification.18  The 
court then held that the ordinance was invalid both on its face and as ap-
plied, because it did not substantially further any important governmental 
interests.19 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, on July 1, 1985, unani-
mously struck down the ordinance as applied to the Cleburne group 
home.20  A six-member majority of the Court, in an opinion written by 
Justice White, held that the court of appeals erred in affording quasi-
suspect status to classifications based on mental retardation for four rea-
sons.21  First, mentally retarded persons differ from the general popula-
tion in a real and important respect because they “have a reduced ability 
 
 11 Id. at 436 n.3. 
 12 Id. at 436. 
 13 Id. at 436-37. 
 14 Id. at 437. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. (quoting the district court opinion). 
 17 Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191, 202 (5th Cir. 1984), 
rev’d, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 18 Id. at 197-98. 
 19 Id. at 200. 
 20 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432. 
 21 Id. at 442. 
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to cope with and function in the everyday world.”22  Second, wrote Jus-
tice White, “the distinctive legislative response, both national and state, 
to the plight of those who are mentally retarded demonstrates . . . that the 
lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies 
a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more 
intrusive oversight by the judiciary.”23  Justice White pointed to Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Developmental Disabilities 
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, the Education of the Handicapped Act, 
and similar laws in the State of Texas as examples of such protective leg-
islation.24  Third, Justice White asserted, this legislative response “ne-
gates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless.”25  
Finally, to deem mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification would 
send the Court down a slippery slope to heightened scrutiny for, among 
others, “the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm.”26 
After explicitly declining to apply heightened scrutiny to the Cle-
burne ordinance, the majority inquired whether the city had a rational ba-
sis for requiring the group home to obtain a special use permit.27  Al-
though the city was motivated by the negative attitudes of those who 
owned property near the proposed group home and the fears of elderly 
residents of the neighborhood, the majority held that the city had no le-
gitimate interest in deferring to the unsubstantiated biases or fears of its 
citizens.28  Likewise, the city could not legitimately deny a special use 
permit based on its fear that students at the junior high school across the 
street would harass the occupants of the group home.29  The city also 
claimed to be worried about the home’s location on a flood plain, but 
Justice White observed that a flood would equally affect a nursing home 
or hospital, either of which could be established on the site of the pro-
posed group home without a special use permit.30  Finally, the city ex-
pressed concern that the high occupancy of the group home might disturb 
the serenity of the neighborhood and cause traffic congestion, fire haz-
ards, and danger to other residents.31  However, the majority found that 
denying a permit to the group home did not rationally further its interest 
 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 443. 
 24 Id. at 443-44. 
 25 Id. at 445. 
 26 Id. at 445-46. 
 27 Id. at 448. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 449. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 449-50. 
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in regulating population density, because a home containing the same 
number of non-retarded occupants would be permitted under the zoning 
ordinance.32  The majority concluded, therefore, that the city could only 
have been motivated by “an irrational prejudice against the mentally re-
tarded.”33 
Nevertheless, the majority declined to decide whether Cleburne’s 
zoning ordinance facially violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Main-
taining that an as-applied ruling “is the preferred course of adjudication 
since it enables courts to avoid making unnecessarily broad constitu-
tional judgments,”34 the majority invalidated the application of the ordi-
nance to the group home but allowed the ordinance to remain on the 
books.35 
In a concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens (joined by Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger) argued for a universal rational-basis standard 
to replace the Court’s traditional tiered system of equal protection analy-
sis.36  However, Justice Stevens agreed that the city of Cleburne had re-
quired CLC to obtain a special use permit “because of the irrational fears 
of neighboring property owners, rather than for the protection of the 
mentally retarded persons who would reside in [the group] home.”37  
Thus, he joined the majority in holding that Cleburne’s ordinance was 
invalid as applied.38 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for himself and Justices Bren-
nan and Blackmun, concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in 
part.39  He opined that the majority’s explicit rejection of heightened 
scrutiny was “wholly superfluous to the decision of this case” because 
the majority found rational-basis review sufficient to invalidate the city’s 
action.40  Moreover, Justice Marshall questioned whether the majority 
actually applied a minimum level of scrutiny as it claimed.41  Instead of 
presuming that the ordinance was constitutional, as is traditionally the 
case with minimal scrutiny,42 the majority presumed just the opposite and 
 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 450. 
 34 Id. at 447. 
 35 Id. at 450. 
 36 Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 37 Id. at 455. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 40 Id. at 456. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Unless a classification trammels 
fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions . . . our decisions pre-
sume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification 
5
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then found the city’s proffered justifications “difficult to believe.”43  Ad-
ditionally, the majority implied that the city could not take “one step at a 
time” to regulate population density, as is usually permitted under the ra-
tional-basis test.44  Justice Marshall termed this approach “‘second order’ 
rational-basis review” and criticized the majority for failing to provide 
guidance to the lower courts as to which level of rational-basis review to 
apply in a given case.45 
Justice Marshall contended that a zoning ordinance that classifies on 
the basis of mental retardation should be subject to intermediate-level 
scrutiny for two reasons.  First, the interest of the mentally retarded in 
establishing group homes is significant because group homes are the 
primary means by which mentally retarded persons can fully participate 
in the community at large.46  Second, “the mentally retarded have been 
subject to a lengthy and tragic history of segregation and discrimina-
tion,”47 including such horrors as warehousing and sterilization.48  In-
deed, noted Justice Marshall, archaic and narrow-minded laws  includ-
ing the one at issue in this case49  remained on the books in many 
states.50 
Justice Marshall criticized the majority’s reasoning in concluding 
that mental retardation was not a quasi-suspect classification.51  He re-
jected the notion that a recent increase in legislative initiatives that bene-
fited the mentally retarded should preclude the application of heightened 
scrutiny to such classifications.52  Legislatures had grown more enlight-
ened in their treatment of African Americans too, and yet the Court still 
regarded race-based distinctions as suspect.53  Furthermore, Justice Mar-
shall observed, the mere fact that governments sometimes have a valid 
reason to classify on the basis of mental retardation did not mean that the 
courts must apply rational-basis review to every such classification: 
“Heightened but not strict scrutiny is considered appropriate in areas 
such as gender, illegitimacy, or alienage because the Court views the trait 
 
challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). 
 43 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 459 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 44 Id. at 458. 
 45 Id. at 460. 
 46 Id. at 461. 
 47 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 48 Id. at 462-63. 
 49 Id. at 464 n.17. 
 50 Id. at 467. 
 51 See id. at 472-73. 
 52 Id. at 465-67. 
 53 Id. 
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as relevant under some circumstances but not others.”54 
Finally, Justice Marshall expressed his disapproval of the majority’s 
decision to strike down the ordinance on an as-applied basis, an unprece-
dented maneuver in the equal protection context.55  According to Justice 
Marshall, “If a discriminatory purpose infects a legislative Act, the Act 
itself is inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause and cannot validly 
be applied to anyone.”56  Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun were 
not alone in their condemnation of the Cleburne majority opinion. 
II. REACTIONS TO CLEBURNE 
Disability rights advocates praised the Court’s result,57 but members 
of the legal community immediately panned its reasoning.  One com-
mentator wrote, “The Court made only a feeble attempt to argue that 
mental retardation does not meet the traditional indicia of suspectness.”58  
He and others believed that the Court should have explicitly applied in-
termediate-level scrutiny to the zoning ordinance for a number of rea-
sons.  Echoing Justice Marshall’s dissent, they argued that legislative ini-
tiatives benefiting the mentally retarded should not preclude heightened 
scrutiny; women and racial minorities receive special protection from the 
courts despite the passage of laws intended to benefit them.59  The Har-
vard Law Review Association maintained that the Court’s focus on re-
medial legislative action was dangerous because “[l]egislative reforms 
may prove short-lived, and even well-intentioned legislation can be mis-
 
 54 Id. at 469. 
 55 Id. at 476. 
 56 Id. at 477 n.25. 
 57 A lawyer with the Washington-based Mental Health Law Project (now known as the 
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law) said that the ruling would “make it easier to establish group 
homes in cities.”  Court Builds Higher Church-State Wall, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 15, 
1985, at 11.  The supervising attorney for Advocacy, Inc., of Austin, Texas, said, “We're very 
pleased, of course, that the justices have given out the message that the retarded aren't second-class 
citizens and can't be pushed aside into industrial areas of the city.”  Philip Hager, Justices Refuse to 
Extend Bias Safeguard to Retarded, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1985, at 1.  Jan Hannah herself greeted the 
decision as a victory, stating, “I’m about to float out of the atmosphere.”  David Hanners, Home’s 
Co-Owner Rejoices, DALL. MORNING NEWS, July 2, 1985, at A11. 
 58 James W. Ellis, On the “Usefulness” of Suspect Classifications, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 375, 
376-77 (1986). 
 59 Id. at 380; J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—Mental 
Retardation Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on That Basis Are 
Subject to Rational Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1074 (1986); Harvard Law Review 
Ass’n, Discrimination Against the Mentally Retarded, 99 HARV. L. REV. 161, 168 (1985); Mark V. 
Wunder, Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally Retarded: A Denial of Quasi-Suspect Status 
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IOWA L. REV. 241, 251 (1986). 
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applied.”60  Commentators were also troubled by the majority’s conclu-
sion that the mentally retarded had political power.61  After all, persons 
with mental retardation were still ineligible to vote in twenty-six states as 
of 1979.62  Moreover, prejudice toward the mentally retarded was still 
very much alive, as evidenced by widespread community resistance to 
the establishment of group homes.63  To these commentators, the Court’s 
pronouncement that the immutability of a group’s defining characteristic 
was irrelevant to a determination of suspectness seemed to fly in the face 
of its earlier decisions.64  Finally, they asserted, the denial of an impor-
tant right (freedom to establish a home) should have justified the use of a 
 
 60 Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Discrimination Against the Mentally Retarded, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 161, 168 (1985). 
 61 Marie Appleby, The Mentally Retarded: The Need for Intermediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 109, 110 (1987); James W. Ellis, On the “Usefulness” of Suspect Classifications, 3 
CONST. COMMENT. 375, 379 (1986); J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Pro-
tection—Mental Retardation Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on 
That Basis Are Subject to Rational Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1075 (1986); Gayle 
Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. 
L.J. 779, 793 (1987); Mark V. Wunder, Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally Retarded: A 
Denial of Quasi-Suspect Status in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IOWA L. REV. 
241, 251-52 (1986). 
 62 Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644, 1645-46, n.10 (1979) 
(“States that refer to idiots or insane persons include: Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182); Ar-
kansas (ARK. CONST. art. 3, § 5); Delaware (DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2); Georgia (GA. CONST. art. II, § 
2, para. 1); Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3); Iowa (IOWA CONST. art. 2, § 5); Kentucky (KY. 
CONST. § 145); Mississippi (MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241); Nevada (NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1); New 
Jersey (N.J. CONST. art. II, para. 6); New Mexico (N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1); Ohio (OHIO CONST. 
art. V, § 6); Texas (TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1); Washington (WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3); Wyoming 
(WYO. CONST. art. 6, § 6).  States that refer to persons non compos[ ]mentis or mentally diseased 
include: Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2); Arizona (ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (non compos[ 
]mentis or insane)); Hawaii (HAWAII CONST. art. II, §2); Minnesota (MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 200.02(25)(b) (West Supp/1978)); Montana (MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2); Ne-
braska (NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 2); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. § 127 (non compos[ ]mentis or in-
sane)); Oregon (OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (idiot or mentally diseased)); Rhode Island (R.I. CONST. 
amend. 38, § 1); West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1); Wisconsin (WIS. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 
(non compos[ ]mentis or insane)).”) 
 63 James W. Ellis, On the “Usefulness” of Suspect Classifications, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 375, 
380 (1986); Mark V. Wunder, Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally Retarded: A Denial of 
Quasi-Suspect Status in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IOWA L. REV. 241, 250 
(1986). 
 64 Marie Appleby, The Mentally Retarded: The Need for Intermediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 109, 110 (1987); James W. Ellis, On the “Usefulness” of Suspect Classifications, 3 
CONST. COMMENT. 375, 379 (1986); J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Pro-
tection—Mental Retardation Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on 
That Basis Are Subject to Rational Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1073 (1986); Har-
vard Law Review Ass’n, Discrimination Against the Mentally Retarded, 99 HARV. L. REV. 161, 167 
(1985); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other 
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793 (1987). 
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heightened level of scrutiny.65 
Like Justice Marshall, observers in the legal community argued that 
the majority’s unnecessary holding as to the proper standard of review 
contravened the Court’s established preference for deciding constitu-
tional cases on the narrowest possible ground.66  They also condemned 
the Court for claiming to use rational-basis review while actually scruti-
nizing the city’s action more searchingly.67  The majority’s disingen-
uousness, commentators feared, would lead to doctrinal confusion among 
the lower courts.68  Additionally, many observers criticized the majority 
for departing from equal protection precedent by striking down a law 
only as applied.69 
III. EXPLAINING CLEBURNE 
If the majority opinion in Cleburne was immediately criticized as 
inconsistent with equal protection jurisprudence, then how can it be ex-
plained?  This Article proposes that the majority’s deviation from time-
honored principles of constitutional decision making can be attributed to 
three interrelated factors.  First, the Court decided Cleburne during a pe-
riod of widespread and open animosity to the establishment of group 
homes for the mentally retarded, a phenomenon often referred to as “not 
 
 65 Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other 
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793 (1987); Mark V. Wunder, Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally 
Retarded: A Denial of Quasi-Suspect Status in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IOWA 
L. REV. 241, 248-49 (1986). 
 66 James W. Ellis, On the “Usefulness” of Suspect Classifications, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 375, 
382 (1986); J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—Mental Retarda-
tion Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1070 (1986). 
 67 Marie Appleby, The Mentally Retarded: The Need for Intermediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 109, 131 (1987); J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—
Mental Retardation Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on That Basis 
Are Subject to Rational Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1079-83 (1986); Gayle Lynn 
Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 
779, 801 (1987). 
 68 Marie Appleby, The Mentally Retarded: The Need for Intermediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 109, 131 (1987); J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—
Mental Retardation Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on That Basis 
Are Subject to Rational Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1079-83 (1986); Gayle Lynn 
Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 
779, 801 (1987). 
 69 J. Daniel Harkins, Case Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—Mental Retardation 
Is Not a Quasi-Suspect Classification; Therefore, Classifications on That Basis Are Subject to Ra-
tional Basis Limitations, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1076-79 (1986); Harvard Law Review Ass’n, 
Discrimination Against the Mentally Retarded, 99 HARV. L. REV. 161, 170-71 (1985); John D. Wil-
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in my back yard,” or “NIMBY.”70  Second, the Court was also influenced 
by the political stance of the Reagan Administration, which was one of 
indifference to the needs of the mentally retarded and other disabled in-
dividuals.  Third, the decision was written by Justice White, whose opin-
ions revealed an idiosyncratic attachment to the rational-basis test. 
A. NEIGHBORHOOD OPPOSITION 
The 1970s and 1980s saw a flurry of court orders requiring states to 
close down their mental institutions and integrate their mentally retarded 
citizens into society at large.71  Yet many Americans abhorred the pros-
pect of sharing their neighborhoods with mentally retarded persons.72  
This section describes the measures to which residents of states such as 
New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Texas resorted to prevent group 
homes from opening in their communities.  The lingering prejudices of 
the American populace evidenced in these stories might have induced the 
Court, ever cautious of outpacing public opinion, to refuse quasi-suspect 
status to classifications based on mental retardation. 
Beginning in the 1920s, states built massive facilities to house the 
mentally retarded — or, more accurately, to protect society from the pro-
miscuous and criminal impulses that mentally retarded persons were 
thought to exhibit.73  These facilities were generally overcrowded, under-
staffed, unhygienic, devoid of intellectual stimulation, and rife with 
physical and emotional abuse.74  Because the goal was to detain the men-
tally retarded for life, states saw no reason to treat them humanely or de-
velop their capabilities.75 
In the 1970s, a wave of class action lawsuits and pressure from dis-
ability rights groups exposed the horrendous conditions in which institu-
tionalized mentally retarded persons lived.76  Over the next decade, ad-
 
 70 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERSONS 
WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT FOR LEGISLATORS 28 
(2000), available at http://www.mnddc.org/parallels2/pdf/00s/00/00-DPD-NCS.pdf. 
 71 See Joann S. Lublin, Group Homes That Serve the Mentally Ill Face New Barriers in Some 
Communities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1986, at 1; Samuel Jan Brakel, Involuntary Institutionalization, 
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 47 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985). 
 72 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF ZONING AND OTHER 
PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED 9-10 
(1983), available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0102/122220.pdf. 
 73 ISSAM B. AMARY, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED-DEVELOPMENTALLY 
DISABLED TO TREATMENT AND EDUCATION 6 (1980). 
 74 Id. 
 75 See id. 
 76 Id. at 8-9; Barbara A. Weiner, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, inTHE MENTALLY 
DISABLED AND THE LAW 251, 251 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985). 
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vocates for the mentally retarded brought legal challenges seeking at first 
to reform these public institutions, and later to replace institutionalized 
care with community-based services.77  Approximately two thirds of the 
nation’s institutionalized mentally ill and retarded patients were released 
into the community during the 1970s, usually by court order,78 and the 
number of group homes for the mentally retarded multiplied by ten.79  In 
1975, the Governor of New York signed a consent decree that required 
the state to relocate the 5,323 residents of Willowbrook State School for 
the Mentally Retarded to neighborhood group homes at the rate of fifty 
people per month.80  Pursuant to a similar consent decree approved in 
1977, Massachusetts reassigned 850 mentally retarded individuals from 
state schools to community residences.81  In 1978, a court in Washington, 
D.C., ordered the city to release at least 100 residents per year from its 
1,300-bed facility for the mentally retarded.82 
The pace of deinstitutionalization was often slower than anticipated, 
largely due to fierce resistance from neighborhood residents and local 
governments.83  However, the transfer of mentally retarded persons out 
of institutions was somewhat hastened by the economic recession in the 
early 1980s; community-based care cost states less than institutional 
 
 77 ISSAM B. AMARY, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED-DEVELOPMENTALLY 
DISABLED TO TREATMENT AND EDUCATION 8-9 (1980); Samuel Jan Brakel, Involuntary Institution-
alization, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 21, 21-23, 40 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 
3d ed. 1985).  By 1983, litigation concerning the operations of public institutions for the mentally 
retarded had been filed in at least thirty-two states.  STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR 
RETARDED PEOPLE 5 (1983). 
 78 Joann S. Lublin, Group Homes That Serve the Mentally Ill Face New Barriers in Some 
Communities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1986, at 1; see also Samuel Jan Brakel, Involuntary Institution-
alization, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 47 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 
1985) (reporting that the number of patients in public mental institutions dropped from 551 in 1956 
to 153 in 1978). 
 79 Researchers counted 611 community residential facilities for persons with mental retarda-
tion in 1972-74 and as many as 6,300 in 1982.  MATTHEW P. JANICKI ET AL., A REPORT ON THE 
AVAILABILITY OF GROUP HOMES FOR PERSONS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 10 (1982), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED231157.pdf. 
 80 Robert Keating, The War Against the Mentally Retarded, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 17, 1979, at 
89-90 (noting that at the time, Willowbrook was the world’s largest residential institution for the 
mentally retarded); see also STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 41 
(1983). 
 81 Jean Dietz, Families Object to Plans for Handicapped, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1985, at 
26. 
 82 Patrice Gaines-Carter, Group-Home Bill Emotionally Debated, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 
1986, at D3; John Purnell, District’s Home for Retarded Finally Is Closed, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29, 
1991, at A11. 
 83 David Kirkwood, Home Sites for the Retarded Still Raise Fears, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
1979, at WC16 (noting that only four years after the Willowbrook consent decree was entered, dein-
stitutionalization in New York was already behind schedule); see also Robert Keating, The War 
Against the Mentally Retarded, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 17, 1979, at 90. 
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care.84  Some states, like Michigan, voluntarily began to close down their 
state institutions during that period,85 and class actions that had been 
filed against institutions in the 1970s continued to be resolved in favor of 
the patients.86  Therefore, even though several court orders that mandated 
deinstitutionalization were handed down in the late 1970s, the zenith of 
community integration of mentally retarded individuals — and opposi-
tion thereto — occurred in the 1980s, when Cleburne was decided. 
A 1983 report issued by the U.S. General Accounting Office87 
found that 37% of group home sponsors who participated in public hear-
ings relating to establishment of their group homes faced considerable 
resistance from community members.88  The most common objections 
raised by these opponents concerned dangerous or unusual behavior of 
group home residents, declining real estate value, and an increase in 
automobile traffic.89  The same percentage of group homes prompted 
community complaints after opening; again, these complaints usually re-
lated to the perceived dangerous or unusual behavior of the residents.90  
The U.S. General Accounting Office also concluded that state preemp-
tive zoning laws, which prohibited localities from excluding group 
homes from residential areas, actually increased community opposition 
 
 84 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERSONS 
WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT FOR LEGISLATORS 13-14 
(2000), available at http://www.mnddc.org/parallels2/pdf/00s/00/00-DPD-NCS.pdf; NEW YORK 
STATE COMMISSION ON QUALITY OF CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED, WILLOWBROOK: FROM 
INSTITUTION TO THE COMMUNITY; A FISCAL AND PROGRAMMATIC REVIEW OF SELECTED 
COMMUNITY RESIDENCES IN NEW YORK CITY 75 (1982). 
 85 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERSONS 
WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT FOR LEGISLATORS 17 
(2000), available at http://www.mnddc.org/parallels2/pdf/00s/00/00-DPD-NCS.pdf. 
 86 In 1984, Pennsylvania settled a case brought by residents of the Pennhurst Center for the 
mentally retarded, agreeing to close the institution within two years.  Accord in Suit Ends 11 Years 
of Dispute over the Retarded, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1985.  Pennhurst had been plagued for years by 
allegations of neglect, forced labor, and physical assault.  William Robbins, Center for Retarded Still 
Enmeshed in Legal Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1981; Workers Indicted in Patient Abuse, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1983.  In a 1985 consent decree, Maryland promised to increase community residen-
tial placements for the mentally retarded threefold.  Brief for the State of Md. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) 
(No. 84-468).  A 1987 settlement in Minnesota required the state to reduce the number of mentally 
retarded people in its regional centers to two hundred.  M. L. Smith, Court’s Jurisdiction over Re-
tarded Ends, STAR TRIB., Aug. 26, 1989, at 01A. 
 87 This agency is now known as the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 
 88 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF ZONING AND OTHER PROBLEMS 
AFFECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED 9-10 (1983), 
available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0102/122220.pdf. 
 89 Id. at 10. 
 90 Id. 
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to group homes, especially in suburban areas.91 
The difficulties that New York encountered in attempting to place 
Willowbrook residents in community-based housing are instructive.  In 
1980, when the state reached an agreement to buy a house in Rockville 
Centre to accommodate mentally retarded individuals, eighteen 
neighbors formed a company “whose sole purpose was to buy the house 
and sell it to anyone but the state.”92  The state had to seek an order 
against the company in federal court before it could establish the group 
home.93 
In 1981, New York State tried to purchase a house for use as a 
group home in an upper-middle-class community in the Five Towns area; 
however, the owner refused to sell it to the state and ultimately took it off 
the market.94  A county official said that establishing a group home was 
“like pulling teeth — with few exceptions, every community does not 
want these homes.”95  The state’s two previous attempts to purchase 
houses in the Five Towns had failed because of resistance from the own-
ers as well as the communities at large.96 
Also in 1981, the town of Pound Ridge, New York, successfully 
challenged the placement of a community residence for six developmen-
tally disabled young adults.97  The Town Supervisor stated, “We would 
like not to have any group homes in Pound Ridge.  But if we have to 
have [one] . . . we would rather have it in a place where it would not of-
fend people.”98  The town proposed to relocate the group home from 
“one of the finer neighborhoods” to an infrequently traveled dirt road on 
the outskirts of Pound Ridge.99  Residents of that fine neighborhood had 
been making obscene phone calls to the group home, yelling profanities 
from their cars, and throwing beer cans at the house.100  However, the 
 
 91 Id. at 24-25. 
 92 Phyllis Bernstein, Home for Retarded Stirs Cedarhurst, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1981, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/19/nyregion/home-for-retarded-stirs-cedarhurst.html (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
 93 Judge Orders Sale of House to State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1981. 
 94 Phyllis Bernstein, Home for Retarded Stirs Cedarhurst, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1981, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/19/nyregion/home-for-retarded-stirs-cedarhurst.html (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); Long Island Journal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1981. 
 95 Phyllis Bernstein, Home for Retarded Stirs Cedarhurst, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1981, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/19/nyregion/home-for-retarded-stirs-cedarhurst.html (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
 96 Id. 
 97 J. B. O’Mahoney, Pound Ridge Group Home in Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1981, at 
A1. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
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community reaction could have been even worse: elsewhere in New 
York, property owners who planned to sell their houses for use as group 
homes, board members voting to approve group homes, and their family 
members received death threats, bomb threats, broken windows, and bru-
tal beatings.101 
New York was not the only state whose communities were inhospi-
table to the mentally retarded.  In 1982, the citizens of New Providence, 
New Jersey, rallied against a plan to open a group home by organizing 
meetings, signing petitions, and writing letters to local, state, and federal 
officials.102  Like the inhabitants of Rockville Centre, they tried to buy 
the house before the group-home organization could finalize the deal.103  
Neighbors protested that the home would “destroy the character of the 
neighborhood” and diminish the values of their properties.104  While con-
ceding that the home “may be good for the retarded people,” they argued 
that it should not be located “in a nice neighborhood like this.”105 
Arson was a common tactic used by particularly virulent opponents 
of group homes for the mentally retarded.  In 1978, someone entered a 
soon-to-open group home in Huntington, Long Island, poured gasoline 
throughout the first floor, and set the house on fire.106  In 1985, arsonists 
burned down a group home for the mentally retarded near Tallahassee, 
Florida, shortly before it was scheduled to open.107  About a month be-
fore the fire, sixty neighborhood residents had met with county officials 
to express fears that the group home would lower property values and 
that the occupants would be dangerous.108  After the fire, one neighbor-
hood resident said, “Just because the building burned doesn’t mean the 
fight is over.”109  In 1989, in the same Five Towns area of New York 
whose communities had resisted group homes earlier in the decade, a 
group home being prepared for mentally retarded adults was set 
ablaze.110 
 
 101 Robert Keating, The War Against the Mentally Retarded, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 17, 1979, at 
87-88. 
 102 Housing a Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1982, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/02/nyregion/housing-a-home.html. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Robert Keating, The War Against the Mentally Retarded, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 17, 1979, at 
87-88.  
 107 Bill Kaczor, Florida Drops Plans for AIDS Group Home, GAINESVILLE SUN, Nov. 7, 
1987, at 5B; Reward Offered for Arsonist, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Jan. 30, 1985, at 9B. 
 108 Reward Offered for Arsonist, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Jan. 30, 1985, at 9B. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Michael Winerip, L.I. Police Suspect Arson in Blaze at Site of a Proposed Group Home, 
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Newspaper accounts of the fight over the Cleburne home tell a simi-
lar story of ignorance and prejudice.  During the public hearing on 
CLC’s special use permit application, one Cleburne resident told the 
Cleburne Planning and Zoning Commission, “It’s not a very pleasant 
thought to go to bed and know there’s thirteen demented, self-afflicted 
people across the street from you.”111  A dentist with a nearby office pre-
sented the commission with a petition signed by twenty-nine families 
opposed to the group home.112  The principal of Cleburne Junior High 
School, located across the street from the proposed group home, claimed 
to be worried about the way his seventh- and eighth-graders might treat 
the residents of the home.113  He acknowledged that the group home was 
needed but wondered, “Is it needed at this site?”114  A 65-year-old man 
who lived three doors away told the Associated Press: 
The older women are fearful of this thing.  There are a lot of older 
women in this neighborhood and they don’t want these people around.  
If these people get by with this, all cities might as well do away with 
their laws.  We’ve lived here all our lives and I don’t know why we 
should be subjected to this.  With retarded people, you don’t ever 
know when they’re going to do something.115 
All told, a majority of property owners within 200 feet of the group home 
requested that the City Council deny CLC a special use permit.116  Even 
as the city denied discriminating against the mentally retarded,117 it justi-
fied its actions by arguing that “the mentally retarded by definition pos-
sess significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning which ex-
ists concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior,” and that “[t]hese 
unique characteristics . . . affect the health, safety and general welfare” of 
“surrounding neighbors” in unspecified ways.118 
Many legal scholars and political scientists have observed that Su-
 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/22/nyregion/li-police-
suspect-arson-in-blaze-at-site-of-a-proposed-group-home.html. 
 111 Richard Carelli, Texas Town Divided over Proposed Group Home, DAILY NEWS 
(BOWLING GREEN, KY.), May 5, 1985, at 23-B. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Court to Rule on Texas Zoning Ban for Retarded, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1984, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/27/us/court-to-rule-on-texas-zoning-ban-for-retarded.html. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Decision May Settle Disputes, ROME NEWS-TRIB., Nov. 21, 1984, at 22-E. 
 116 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 9, City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468). 
 117 Id. at 5. 
 118 Id. at 5-6. 
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preme Court decisions generally align with popular opinion.119  In Pro-
fessor Barry Friedman’s words, “The Justices live on this planet and 
typically are aware of what happens on it.”120  Public opinion of the men-
tally retarded had certainly improved by the 1980s — few advocated 
forced sterilization, for instance — but antiquated notions of mentally 
retarded persons as dangerous, unpredictable, and unsightly persisted in 
the American consciousness.  Perhaps it should not be surprising, there-
fore, that the Cleburne majority, even as it frowned upon the “irrational 
prejudice” of the citizens of Cleburne, went out of its way to hold that 
mentally retarded individuals did not deserve special consideration under 
the Equal Protection Clause and left the city’s discriminatory zoning or-
dinance on the books.  The opinion, with a wink and a nudge, invited 
Cleburne and other cities to continue to exclude mentally retarded per-
sons from respectable neighborhoods, so long as they did this by apply-
ing more cleverly constructed ordinances in a more subtle way.  Just as 
Americans were not ready to let mentally retarded persons move in next 
door, the Justices in the majority were not ready to extend to mentally 
retarded persons the constitutional status they deserved. 
B. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 
Through the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government was increas-
ingly attentive to the problems facing mentally retarded Americans.121  
When Ronald Reagan became president, however, his Administration 
radically reduced federal funding for programs and services for the men-
tally retarded and abandoned its duty to enforce disability rights laws.122  
 
 119 See Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judi-
cial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1294-95 (2004); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The 
Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public 
Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1019-21 (2004); Robert F. Nagel, Limiting the Court by Limiting Life 
Tenure, in REFORMING THE COURT 131 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); 
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006). 
 120 Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 325 (2005). 
 121 See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR 
NATIONAL ACTION TO COMBAT MENTAL RETARDATION 201 (1962); Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, § 3 (1975); The Developmentally Disabled 
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486, § 113 (1975); The Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, § 504 (1973); Pub. L. No. 92-223, 85 Stat. 802 
(1971). 
 122 See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 396 n.20 (1991) (“The federal government's virtual abdication of administrative 
enforcement efforts for disability rights is well-documented, both in congressional hearings and in 
scholarly articles. See, e.g., [Robert D. Dinerstein,] The Absence of Justice, 63 NEB. L. REV. 680 
(1984) (during Reagan Administration, historic position of Justice Department as protector of rights 
of institutionalized persons eroded substantially).”). 
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Furthermore, the Reagan Administration explicitly urged the Court in 
Cleburne to apply only rational-basis review.123  It is likely that the ex-
ecutive’s disregard for the special needs of persons with mental retarda-
tion helped spur the Court to grant deference to legislative action dis-
criminating against those persons. 
Federal action in the field of mental retardation and developmental 
disabilities proliferated beginning in 1961 with the establishment of the 
President’s Panel on Mental Retardation.124  The panel consisted of 
twenty-seven physicians, scientists, educators, lawyers, and consumers, 
tasked by President John F. Kennedy with charting a “comprehensive 
and coordinated attack on the problem of mental retardation.”125  Many 
of the panel’s recommendations were enacted into law in 1963126 as part 
of the Maternal and Child Health and Mental Retardation Planning 
Amendments127 and the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community 
Mental Health Centers Construction Act.128  These and other federal ini-
tiatives funded institutions around the country that agreed to comply with 
a set of guidelines designed to raise the quality of education and treat-
ment provided to mentally retarded persons housed in their facilities.129  
In the 1970s, Congress enacted laws to reimburse state intermediate-care 
facilities that provided “active treatment” to the mentally retarded;130 to 
prohibit disability discrimination by federal agencies, federal contractors, 
and programs receiving federal financial assistance;131 to subsidize state 
“protection and advocacy” programs for the developmentally disabled 
and mentally retarded;132 and to require all federally funded public 
schools to provide equal access to education for disabled children.133 
 
 123 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, City of Cleburne, Tex. 
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468). 
 124 PRESIDENT’S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL 
ACTION TO COMBAT MENTAL RETARDATION 201 (1962). 
 125 Id.; see also DAVID BRADDOCK, FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD MENTAL RETARDATION AND 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 17 (1987). 
 126 David L. Braddock & Susan L. Parish, An Institutional History of Disability, in 
HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 11, 46 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001). 
 127 Maternal and Child Health and Mental Retardation Planning Amendments of 1963, Pub. 
L. No. 88-156, 77 Stat. 273 (1963). 
 128 Mental Retardation Facilities Construction Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 
(1963). 
 129 ISSAM B. AMARY, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED-DEVELOPMENTALLY 
DISABLED TO TREATMENT AND EDUCATION vii (1980). 
 130 Pub. L. No. 92-223, 85 Stat. 802 (1971). 
 131 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, § 504 (1973). 
 132 The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 
Stat. 486, § 113 (1975). 
 133 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, § 
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In 1981, however, President Reagan took office, announcing in his 
first inaugural address that he intended “to curb the size and influence of 
the Federal establishment.”134  By the “Federal establishment,” he meant 
not the military (defense spending increased by 40% during his two 
terms in office)135 but rather entitlement programs and social services, 
including those that catered to the mentally retarded.  The President im-
mediately launched a multipronged campaign to restrict federal financial 
support for mental retardation programs and services.  His first budget136 
called for large multipurpose block grants, which offered the states more 
flexible administration but less money in the areas of social services, 
health care, and mental health.137  During President Reagan’s first term, 
federal spending on special education,138 special recreation,139 intermedi-
ate-care facilities,140 the training of mental retardation personnel,141 and 
income maintenance for mentally retarded persons142 stagnated or de-
clined.  Whereas total federal funding for services for the mentally re-
tarded had increased at an average rate of 15.5% per year from fiscal 
year (“FY”) 1972 to FY 1980,143 it actually decreased in practical terms 
every year between FY 1981 and FY 1985, after taking inflation into ac-
 
3 (1975). 
 134 President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/124/ pres61.html. 
 135 Greg Schneider and Renae Merle, Reagan’s Defense Buildup Bridged Military Eras, 
WASH. POST, June 9, 2004, at E01. 
 136 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). 
 137 DAVID BRADDOCK, FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD MENTAL RETARDATION AND 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 26 (1987). 
 138 In real economic terms, federal assistance for special education for mentally retarded chil-
dren “peaked in FY [fiscal year] 1980 and fell steadily every year thereafter through FY 1985.”  Id. 
at 39. 
 139 The Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, § 305 (1978) (authorized grants to state agencies 
and to public or nonprofit organizations for the development of programs to provide disabled indi-
viduals with recreational activities to improve their mobility and socialization).  The Reagan Ad-
ministration, however, did not request any funding for this program from FY 1981 to FY 1984.  
DAVID BRADDOCK, FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES 119 (1987). 
 140 From FY 1982 to FY 1985, real growth in intermediate-care facility reimbursements aver-
aged only 1.4% annually, compared with over 56% annually between FY 1972 and FY 1981.  
DAVID BRADDOCK, FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES 57, 59 (1987). 
 141 From FY 1980 to FY 1983, federal support for the training of personnel in mental retarda-
tion fell 17%.  Adjusted FY 1984-85 funding levels “represented the smallest spending commitment 
for training in 22 years.” Id. 
 142 The rate of growth in federal income maintenance spending for persons with mental retar-
dation averaged 34% per year in the 1950s, 12% per year in the 1960s, 10% per year in the 1970s, 
and only 2.2% per year during the first half of the 1980s.  Id. at 133. 
 143 Id. at 32. 
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count.144  In FY 1982, the percentage of the federal government’s total 
annual budget devoted to financing mental-retardation-related activities 
fell for the first time in thirty years.145  Moreover, a disproportionately 
large share of federal spending for the mentally retarded went toward the 
relatively small proportion of mentally retarded persons living in state-
run institutions.146 
Meanwhile, President Reagan’s policy of deregulation led to a “vir-
tual abdication of administrative enforcement efforts for disability 
rights.”147  The Reagan Administration asserted, at a time when states 
were still consigning mentally retarded persons to unnecessarily restric-
tive institutional settings without due process, that “federal regulatory 
and judicial roles [could] safely recede because states already provide[d] 
adequate legal protection for their needy citizens.”148  Accordingly, the 
President established a Task Force for Regulatory Relief and instructed it 
to “dismantle such administrative monstrosities as affirmative action” for 
disabled federal employees and contractors.149  Administration officials 
not only proposed a drastic curtailment of the federal government’s func-
tions in implementing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
of 1975,150 but also attempted to dilute equal-access provisions of other 
laws relating to health and social services, recreational programs, em-
ployment, and program accessibility.151 
Additionally, President Reagan sought to eradicate the Legal Ser-
vices Corporation (“LSC”),152 the federally operated legal aid organiza-
tion, which was under a congressional mandate to provide “priority ser-
vice” to persons with disabilities.153  When his effort to destroy the LSC 
failed, he slashed funding for it and appointed a board of directors who 
 
 144 See Inflation Data, Historical U.S. Inflation Rate 1914-Present, 
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/HistoricalInflation.aspx?dsInflation_currentPage=2 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 145 DAVID BRADDOCK, FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD MENTAL RETARDATION AND 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 57, 181-82 (1987). 
 146 Id. at 183. 
 147 Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 396 n.20 (1991). 
 148 STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 78 (1983). 
 149 Edward D. Berkowitz, A Historical Preface to the Americans with Disabilities Act, in 
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 96, 107-08 (Hugh Davis Graham ed., 1994). 
 150 Otis H. Stephens, Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and the Disabled, in THE REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 157, 166 (Tinsley E. Yarbrough ed., 1985). 
 151 STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 169-70 (1983). 
 152 Kimberly McKelvey, Comment, Public Interest Lawyering in the United States and Mon-
tana: Past, Present and Future, 67 MONT. L. REV. 337, 344 (2006). 
 153 John Parry, Rights and Entitlements in the Community, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND 
THE LAW, 607, 680, 683 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985). 
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openly opposed the very existence of the organization they headed.154  
One disability law expert characterized this campaign against the LSC as 
typical of the Reagan Administration’s “sophisticated and steady attack 
on the roots of the disability rights movement.”155 
Other courses of action taken by the Reagan Administration simi-
larly reflected a withdrawal of support for the mentally retarded and 
other disabled persons.  In 1981, for example, the Reagan-era Social Se-
curity Administration tried to terminate disability benefits for a signifi-
cant number of legitimate recipients.156  In a 1984 Supreme Court case, 
Grove City College v. Bell,157 President Reagan’s Secretary of Education 
successfully argued for a narrow interpretation of the coverage provi-
sions of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and other anti-
discrimination statutes.158  Four years later, when Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Restoration Act, which would have overturned the Court’s 
ruling in Grove City and expanded the scope of civil rights protections, 
President Reagan vetoed it.159  Finally, although the Civil Rights of Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act of 1980 authorized the Attorney General to sue 
state or local public officials where there was “a pattern or practice of re-
sistance to the full enjoyment” of the federal rights of residents of state-
run institutions,160 the Reagan-era Department of Justice exercised this 
authority only twice on behalf of people with developmental disabili-
ties.161 
Many observers of the Supreme Court have contended that, in both 
statutory and constitutional interpretation, the Court is responsive to the 
preferences of the political branches of government.162  Yet one need not 
speculate as to whether the Reagan Administration’s general lack of in-
 
 154 Kimberly McKelvey, Comment, Public Interest Lawyering in the United States and Mon-
tana: Past, Present and Future, 67 MONT. L. REV. 337, 344 (2006). 
 155 STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 244 (1983). 
 156 Otis H. Stephens, Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and the Disabled, in THE REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 157, 170 (Tinsley E. Yarbrough ed., 1985). 
 157 Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
 158 Otis H. Stephens, Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and the Disabled, in THE REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 157, 167 (Tinsley E. Yarbrough ed., 1985). 
 159 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).  Congress 
voted to override the President’s veto.  See RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST 
DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 25 (2005). 
 160 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1997-1997j (Westlaw 2010). 
 161 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS 
ACT: HAS IT FULFILLED ITS PROMISE?, app. II (2005), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2005/ personsact.htm#appendixii. 
 162 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 549, 592 (2009); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpre-
tation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 415 (1991). 
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terest in the rights and needs of the mentally retarded affected the out-
come of Cleburne.  The Administration, represented by Solicitor General 
Rex E. Lee, filed an amicus curiae brief in Cleburne in which it opposed 
the recognition of mental retardation as a quasi-suspect classification.163  
The Solicitor General began by noting that Congress and many state leg-
islatures had exhibited increasing “solicitude for the special needs of 
mentally retarded persons.”164  As examples of such legislation, he listed 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Developmental Dis-
abilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, the Education of the Handi-
capped Act, and a Texas state law165  the very same statutes that Jus-
tice White later cited in his opinion.166  Solicitor General Lee then argued 
that legislatures may properly take mental retardation into account be-
cause “unlike members of racial minorities, mentally retarded individuals 
are different from others in respect to their needs and capacities.”167  Al-
though the mentally retarded deserve “concern and sympathy,”168 such 
sentiments do not justify “creating yet another group enabled to compel 
heightened scrutiny of legislative actions affecting their interests.”169   
Ultimately, a majority of the Court agreed.  Its slippery-slope argu-
ment referencing “the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the in-
firm”170 echoed the Justice Department’s brief, which warned that any 
special constitutional protections offered to the mentally retarded would 
also have to be extended to “[the] physically handicapped, the infirm, 
and even those suffering from diseases such as alcoholism.”171  Solicitor 
General Lee took care to note that the Court could still “conclude that the 
denial of a special-use permit in this case was so wanting in rationality as 
to fail to pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”172  This, of course, was exactly the approach taken by the 
Cleburne majority.173 
 
 163 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, City of Cleburne, 
Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468). 
 164 Id. at 5. 
 165 Id. at 18-19. 
 166 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985) (majority 
opinion). 
 167 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 8, City of Cleburne, 
Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468). 
 168 Id. at 9. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-46. 
 171 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 21, City of Cleburne, 
Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468). 
 172 Id. at 6. 
 173 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435. 
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C. JUSTICE WHITE 
The third factor influencing the majority opinion in Cleburne was 
its author’s idiosyncratic method of deciding Fourteenth Amendment 
cases.  Justice White believed in giving the legislative and executive 
branches wide latitude to make political judgments.174  However, 
whether his credo was truly one of judicial restraint is called into ques-
tion by his “activist” desire to provide guidance to the lower courts as 
early as possible and his fondness for invalidating statutes under rational-
basis review.175  When viewed in the context of Justice White’s jurispru-
dence, then, Cleburne seems less an aberration and more a predictable 
product of the Justice’s various analytical tics. 
Justice White’s jurisprudence was characterized, above all else, by 
deference to the political branches.176  Justice Stevens once observed, 
“Of all the Justices with whom I have served, I remember Byron [White] 
as the one who most consistently accorded a strong presumption of valid-
ity to the work of the Congress and the Executive.”177  Justice White ex-
plicitly articulated his code of judicial restraint in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
where he wrote 
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when 
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cogni-
zable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. . . . There 
should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach 
of [the Due Process] Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the 
category of rights deemed to be fundamental.178 
Reflective of this restraint, Justice White refused to enlarge the 
privileged circle of protected interests and classifications eliciting close 
 
 174 See Michael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy: Justice White and Strict Rational Basis Scrutiny, 
74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (2003); Jonathan D. Varat, Justice White and the Breadth and Allo-
cation of Federal Authority, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 371, 372 (1987). 
 175 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285 
(2003); see also Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 502-07 (1965) (White, J., concurring) (while the 
majority applied strict scrutiny to invalidate a statute prohibiting the use and distribution of contra-
ceptives, Justice White would have invalidated the statute under minimal scrutiny); San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 68 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); N.Y. City Transit Auth. 
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 609 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27 
(1985). 
 176 See Michael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy: Justice White and Strict Rational Basis Scrutiny, 
74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (2003); Jonathan D. Varat, Justice White and the Breadth and Allo-
cation of Federal Authority, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 371, 372 (1987). 
 177 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285 
(2003). 
 178 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986). 
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judicial review,179 especially because this circle had already expanded in 
the years preceding Cleburne.180  Justice White was most comfortable 
applying the rational-basis test, which minimized judicial interference 
with legislative will.181  Even when he purported to apply strict scrutiny, 
as in race cases, he actually engaged in an analysis similar to the beefed-
up rational-basis review seen in Cleburne.182 
The notion that Justice White wanted to circumscribe the role of the 
judiciary, however, is at odds with his eagerness in Cleburne to prema-
turely rule that mental retardation was not a quasi-suspect classification.  
In this respect, a remark by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Justice White’s 
replacement on the Court) may be illuminating; she once stated, “Byron 
White was an ‘activist’ Justice only in his unswerving view that the 
Court ought not let circuit splits linger, that it should say what the federal 
law is sooner rather than later.”183  Thus, he issued fifty-four dissents 
from denials of certiorari in the 1984 term, forty dissents in the 1985 
term, and fifty-eight dissents in the 1992 term.184  Although the Fifth Cir-
cuit was the only federal appellate court to have ruled on the appropriate 
 
 179 See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195; Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747, 790 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that a woman’s ability to abort her 
pregnancy is not a fundamental liberty interest and that restrictions on abortion should be subjected 
to only “the most minimal judicial scrutiny”); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) 
(holding that alienage classifications, although subjected to heightened scrutiny when they primarily 
affect economic interests, should receive less demanding scrutiny when they primarily serve a politi-
cal function). 
 180 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding that discrimina-
tion against undocumented aliens “can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substan-
tial goal of the State”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that sex-based classifica-
tion must withstand intermediate-level scrutiny); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) 
(applying “less than strictest” but not “toothless” scrutiny to statutory classification on the basis of 
illegitimate birth). 
 181 See Allan Ides, The Jurisprudence of Justice Byron White, 103 YALE L.J. 419, 447 (1993). 
 182 Michael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy: Justice White and Strict Rational Basis Scrutiny, 74 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1329, 1366 (2003); see also Kate Stith, Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal Lib-
erals, 103 YALE L.J. 19, 30 (1993) (stating that Justice White also favored a sort of rational-basis 
test in the context of criminal procedure, insisting that “the overriding command of the Fourth 
Amendment is its inclusive ‘reasonableness’ requirement, not its more limited ‘warrant’ require-
ment.”). 
 183 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285 
(2003). 
 184 Michael J. Broyde, The Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An Analysis of Jus-
tice White’s Dissents from Denial of Certiorari During the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 610, 612-
14 (1987); Kate Stith, Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 YALE L.J. 19, 23 n.26 
(1993).  For purposes of comparison, the Justices issued fewer than 300 such dissents with written 
opinions between 1982 and 1987, an average of seven per Justice per year.  Michael J. Broyde, The 
Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An Analysis of Justice White’s Dissents from Denial 
of Certiorari During the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 610, 613 n.12 (1987). 
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level of scrutiny for classifications based on mental retardation,185 multi-
ple district courts had addressed the issue and arrived at differing conclu-
sions.186  In light of the surge of litigation over the rights of the mentally 
retarded over the previous decade, Justice White probably should have 
clarified the standard of review for the benefit of the lower courts. 
Further contradicting Justice White’s reputation as a proponent of 
judicial restraint is the fact that, while he proclaimed his loyalty to the 
rational-basis test, the analysis he actually engaged in under the auspices 
of this test often resembled intermediate scrutiny.187  Cleburne is em-
blematic of his penchant for striking down statutes under rational-basis 
review.  The first hint of this proclivity appeared in Justice White’s con-
curring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,188 a substantive due process 
case.  Whereas the majority found that marital privacy was a fundamen-
tal liberty interest triggering strict scrutiny, and that Connecticut’s statute 
prohibiting the distribution and use of contraceptives unconstitutionally 
infringed upon this interest, Justice White would have invalidated the 
statute after only minimal scrutiny.189  Several years later, dissenting in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Justice White 
posited that reliance by the Texas school-financing system on local prop-
erty taxation was irrational and therefore a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 190  In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, Justice 
White, again in dissent, asserted that the New York City Transit Author-
ity’s policy against employing methadone users violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because it was irrational and invidious.191  In Williams v. 
Vermont, Justice White authored a majority opinion that held that Ver-
mont’s use tax on automobiles purchased by out-of-staters who subse-
 
 185 Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1984), 
rev’d, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 186 Compare Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 490 (D.N.D. 
1982) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a classification discriminating against mentally retarded 
persons), and Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 957-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (same) (dictum), with 
N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) 
(holding that mental retardation is not a suspect classification), Developmental Disabilities Advo-
cacy Ctr. v. Melton, 521 F. Supp. 365, 371 (D.N.H. 1981) (same), and Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. 
Supp. 472, 512 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification). 
 187 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-07 (1965) (White, J., concurring); 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 68 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); N.Y. City 
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 609 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Williams v. Vermont.,  
472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985). 
 188 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-07 (1965) (White, J., concurring). 
 189 Id. at 503-07. 
 190 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 68 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
 191 N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 609 (1979) (White, J., dissenting). 
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quently moved to Vermont had no legitimate purpose.192  Finally, Justice 
White voted to strike down a state veterans’ preference law in Attorney 
General of New York v. Soto-Lopez193 and a provision of the federal Food 
Stamp Act in Lyng v. Castillo194 on the grounds that the classifications at 
issue were irrational.  This parade of cases “illustrate[s] Justice White’s 
attachment to the rational-basis standard and his tendency to find that it 
has been violated when other Justices reach the conclusion of unconstitu-
tionality, if at all, only through some form of heightened scrutiny.”195 
In sum, the Cleburne opinion exemplifies the push and pull of Jus-
tice White’s deferential and activist impulses.  Justice White consistently 
held that minimal scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review in 
Fourteenth Amendment cases, and Cleburne was no exception.196  He 
also preferred to set bright-line rules for the lower courts to apply,197 so 
in Cleburne he announced, unnecessarily, that classifications based on 
mental retardation did not deserve heightened scrutiny.  Finally, Cle-
burne was only one in a long line of Justice White’s opinions to hold a 
statute invalid under rational-basis review.198  If the task of writing the 
Court’s opinion in Cleburne had been assigned to a different Justice, the 
course of history for Americans with mental retardation might have 
changed completely. 
CONCLUSION: CLEBURNE’S LEGACY 
The Cleburne litigation and decision appear to have spurred some 
beneficial legislative changes for mentally retarded individuals.  Shortly 
before the Supreme Court handed down its ruling, Texas passed a law 
that permitted community-based residences housing up to six disabled 
persons to set up in any residential district in any city,199 and the Cle-
 
 192 Williams v. Vermont., 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985). 
 193 Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 916 (1986) (White, J., concurring). 
 194 Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 643 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
 195 Michael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy: Justice White and Strict Rational Basis Scrutiny, 74 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1329, 1365-66 (2003). 
 196 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Ob-
stetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 790 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982). 
 197 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285 
(2003). 
 198 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-07 (1965) (White, J., concurring); 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 68 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); N.Y. City 
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 609 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Williams v. Vermont.,  
472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985); Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 916 (1986) (White, J., 
concurring); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 643 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
 199 Community Homes for Disabled Persons Location Act, TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 123 
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burne municipal code was amended accordingly.200  At some point, the 
city also deleted the antiquated reference to the “feeble-minded” from its 
code.201  On the national level, Cleburne was understood to “put cities on 
notice that they need clear, rational reasons if they want to treat group 
homes for the developmentally disabled . . . differently from other resi-
dential uses.”202  The decision also “helped create some momentum to 
amend the Fair Housing Act to prohibit disability discrimination in hous-
ing,”203 a change that occurred in 1988.204 
On the whole, however, Cleburne did little to enhance the status of 
mentally retarded persons  — or persons with disabilities in general205 — 
in American society.  The courts have relied on Cleburne to uphold, inter 
alia, a statute allowing for the indefinite commitment of persons with 
mental retardation,206 a workers’ compensation scheme that denied per-
manent partial disability benefits to claimants who sustained severe skin 
damage on the job,207 a policy excluding persons with Alzheimer’s-
related dementia from a veteran’s home,208 a welfare program that placed 
a one-year limit on benefits to disabled persons while providing open-
ended benefits to all other recipients,209 and the use of peremptory chal-
lenges to strike potential jurors because of their disabilities.210 
Justice Marshall’s prediction that the Cleburne analysis would con-
fuse the lower courts came true in the years immediately following the 
decision.211  In 1987, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit as-
 
(Westlaw 2001). 
 200 CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 155.30-31 (2009). 
 201 See id. 
 202 Am. Planning Ass’n, Homes for the Developmentally Disabled, ZONING NEWS 1 (Jan. 
1986); see also James T. Hogan, Comment, Community Housing Rights for the Mentally Retarded, 
1987 DET. C. L. REV. 869, 919 (1987) (“Absent carefully crafted wording, most ordinances would 
probably be invalidated under the Cleburne test.”). 
 203 RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 14 (2005). 
 204 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604 
(Westlaw 2010). 
 205 Cleburne’s holding is commonly interpreted to apply to all forms of disability, not only 
mental retardation.  See, e.g., Matthew D. Taggart, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
After Garrett: Defective Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity and Its Remedial Impact, 91 CALIF. L. 
REV. 837, 841 n.71 (2003) (“Cleburne clearly stands for the proposition that the disabled are a non-
suspect class and disability discrimination claims are subject only to ‘rational basis’ review . . . .”). 
 206 In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Minn. 1986). 
 207 Barton v. Ducci Elec. Contractors, Inc., 730 A.2d 1149, 1165 (Conn. 1999). 
 208 Estate of Martin v. Cal. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 560 F.3d 1042, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 209 Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 210 United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 876 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 211 See generally Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Im-
pact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 617-19 (2000) (quoting cases that interpreted 
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sumed that a “second order” rational-basis test was the appropriate stan-
dard for reviewing the exclusion of mentally impaired and developmen-
tally disabled persons from a federally funded housing project.212  Many 
federal district courts, too, believed that Cleburne endorsed a more strin-
gent form of rational-basis review and that equal protection doctrine was 
in upheaval.213 
However, this confusion was short-lived, as was any possibility that 
the courts would meaningfully scrutinize classifications based on mental 
retardation.  In Heller v. Doe,214 handed down in 1993, the Supreme 
Court used a traditional, deferential rational-basis test to analyze a statu-
tory scheme governing the involuntary commitment of mentally disabled 
persons to state institutions.215  The majority disclaimed ever “pur-
port[ing] to apply a different standard of rational basis review” in a case 
involving the mentally retarded.216  Justice David Souter, dissenting, 
wrote, “While the Court cites Cleburne once, and does not purport to 
overrule it, neither does the Court apply it, and at the end of the day Cle-
burne’s status is left uncertain.”217  After Heller, review of legislative 
distinctions based on mental disability once again became “tantamount to 
no review at all.”218 
Ironically, given the Cleburne majority’s emphasis on congressional 
sensitivity to the needs of the mentally retarded, the Court’s premature 
rejection of intermediate scrutiny in Cleburne ultimately curtailed Con-
gress’s power to protect individuals with disabilities.  In Board of Trus-
tees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,219 the Court declined to re-
consider its holding in Cleburne that classifications based on disability 
were constitutional as long as they were rational.220  Because Title I of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act required state employers to accom-
modate disabled employees even when their refusal to provide such ac-
commodations would be fiscally rational, the Court ruled that Congress 
had exceeded its constitutional authority.221 
 
Cleburne as requiring a more rigorous type of scrutiny than traditional rational-basis review). 
 212 Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 213 See, e.g., Burstyn v. Miami Beach, 663 F. Supp. 528, 533 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Long Island 
Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 409-10 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. 
Supp. 983, 988-990 (D. Kan. 1985). 
 214 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993). 
 215 Id. at 319-321. 
 216 Id. at 321. 
 217 Id. at 337 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 218 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 323 n.3 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 219 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 220 Id. at 367. 
 221 Id. at 372-74. A string of other Supreme Court decisions at the turn of the century whittled 
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In short, although Cleburne was a nominal victory for the operators 
and inhabitants of group homes, its legacy is one of anemic constitutional 
and statutory protections for the mentally retarded and other disabled in-
dividuals.  In this legal landscape, government-sanctioned prejudice 
against mentally retarded persons has endured.  As this Article went to 
print, eight state constitutions still deny voting rights to “idiots”  or 
people deemed mentally incompetent or thought to lack the capacity to 
understand222  and as recently as 2007, election laws in twenty-two 
states disqualified voters based on some mental-status criteria.223  Many 
states “link mental disability to a present and future inability to care for a 
child,” thus opening the door to the (ostensibly discriminatory) termina-
tion of parental rights on the basis of disability.224  Additionally, several 
states prohibit persons with mental disabilities,225 sometimes termed 
“imbecile[s],”226 from marrying.  Finally, in at least one jurisdiction, 
once a mentally retarded person is involuntarily committed to an institu-
tion, he or she may never have an opportunity to be heard in court 
again.227  These and other provisions of state law that unfairly disadvan-
tage people with mental retardation might not be on the books today if 
the Cleburne Court had expressly applied the robust form of scrutiny 
 
down the coverage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and arguably betrayed the 
Court’s continuing aversion to protecting disabled persons from discrimination.  See Toyota Motor 
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (setting a very high standard for demonstrat-
ing a substantial limitation in the major life activity of performing manual tasks); Albertson’s, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566-567 (1999) (holding that a plaintiff who was blind in one eye was 
not necessarily “disabled” under the ADA); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521, 
525 (1999) (holding that the defendant did not discriminate on the basis of disability when it fired an 
employee because of his high blood pressure); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488-
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The Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 940 (2007). 
 224 Dale Margolin, No Chance to Prove Themselves: The Rights of Mentally Disabled Parents 
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2010). 
 225 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.990(2) (Westlaw 2010). 
 226 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-109 (Westlaw 2010). 
 227 Laura W. Harper, Comment, Involuntary Commitment of People with Mental Retardation: 
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that, as other critics have argued, such classifications warrant.  Cleburne 
was “wrong the day it was decided”228 and is just as wrong today.  It 
should be overturned. 
 
 
 228 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (referring to Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
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